Korsgaard(2008), “From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble", The Constitution of Agency

<목차>

0. Introduction (174-176)
1. Acting from Duty (176-187)
2. Acting for the Sake of the Noble (187-196)
3. Acting from Natural Inclination (196-206)

 

Introduction

 

“Kant claims that a person who helps others with pleasure from motives of natural sympathy displays no moral worth, while a person who lacks any natural inclination to help others but nevertheless does so, from the motive of duty, does display moral worth (G 4:398). This appears to be in stark contrast with Aristotle’s claim that it is the mark of a good person to take pleasure in moral action (NE 1.8 1099a16-21).”

 

“In this essay I will argue that this apparent contrast does not reflect any ethical disagreement between the two philosophers at all. There is a disagreement at work here, but it is psychological rather than ethical”

 

“Yet behind these contrasts, apparent and real, is one undeniable similarity. Aristotle and Kant both believe that in human beings, reason can be practical. [...] It is the view that human beings exercise choice [...] in the determination of our actions.”

 

*문제 상황 : 도덕적 행위에 있어 경향성을 중심으로 한 칸트와 아리스토텔레스 윤리학의 충돌

*논문의 목표 : 칸트와 아리스토텔레스 윤리학은 충돌하지 않으며, 인간 이성의 실천성에 있어 선택을 중심으로 근본적인 유사성을 가짐을 밝힘

 

“To say that human beings are rational is not just to say that we are rule-following or logical, but rather to say that we are capable of authentic mental activity, of an engagement with the world that goes beyond mere reaction.”

 

“Aristotle and Kant of course acknowledge that passions, inclinations, and impulses, as well as reflective deliberation and choice, play an important role in the determination of action. And I believe that for both [...] is to explain how that role may be accommodated in a theory of rationally governed and so authentically self-generated conduct.”

 

*인간 이성의 실천성 = 인간의 진정한 정신적 행위의 가능성, 세계에 대한 적극적 개입의 가능성

*문제 상황 : 인간은 도덕적 행위에 있어 이성적 고려와 선택 외에도 경향성의 영향을 받음

*칸트와 아리스토텔레스 윤리학의 목표

  : 인간 이성의 적극적 측면(실천성)과 인간 심리의 수용적 측면(경향성)을 화해시키기

  : 이성적이고 자발적인 행위의 도덕 이론에 정념, 경향성, 충동을 수용시키기

 

Acting from Duty

 

“Good-willed actions are good because of the way that they are willed, or, as I will put it, chosen. [...] Principle of a good will is that of choosing actions whose maxims qualify to be universal laws.”

 

“Kant clearly takes it to be obvious, just as Aristotle does, that a morally good action must be chosen for its own sake. But being chosen for its own sake is not sufficient to make an action morally good.”

 

“Kant goes on to assert that what gives an action moral value, then, is not the agent’s purpose, but rather the ‘maxim’ or ‘principle of volition’ on which it is done.”

 

*도덕적 행위

  = 선의지에서 나온 행위 = 보편적 법칙이 될 수 있는 준칙을 따르는 행위를 선택하면서 나온 행위

*도덕적 행위가 아닌 것

1) 행위 자체가 목적으로 선택되지 않는 행위

  ex) 정치인이 명성을 위해 사람을 도와주는 행위

2) 행위 자체가 목적으로 선택되었으나 그것의 준칙이 올바르지 않은 행위

  ex) 호의적인 사람(sympathetic)이 즐거이 사람을 도와주는 행위

  cf) 여기서 호의적인 사람의 행위 목적이 자신의 즐거움은 아님. 자기 이익을 따지는 동기가 없을뿐더러, 결정적으로 행위의 목적이 사람을 도움이 명확하지만 도덕적 가치가 없음을 보이기 위해 칸트가 드는 예시이기 때문.

 

“Kant suggests that there are two principles of volition or choice that might govern this decision: morality or self-love.”

 

“Kant’s point about the naturally sympathetic person [...] is not that he wants to help others only because it pleases him to do so. The trouble is that he chooses to help others only because he wants to. His action is chosen as a desirable one, one which he would enjoy doing.”

 

“The person who acts from duty, by contrast, chooses the action because she conceives it as one that is required of her. [...] The point is that she chooses helping as her purpose because that is what she is required to do. [...] The dutiful person takes the maxim of helping others to express a requirement.”

 

*의지의 두 가지 원칙 : 도덕성과 자기애

*호의적인(sympathetic) 사람의 원칙 : 자신이 그 행위를 원함, 즉 자신이 즐거운 것을 행함 → 자기애

*충실한(dutiful) 사람의 원칙 : 자신에게 그 행위가 요구됨, 즉 자신에게 요구되는 것을 행함 → 도덕성

⇒ 행위 자체가 목적으로 선택된 이유, 행위를 의지하는 원칙에서 행위의 도덕적 가치가 비롯됨

 

“Kant’s view seems to be that if you act unreflectively, the principle of self-love is your principle of volition by default.”

 

“[...] he thinks that the pursuit of reflection –that is, enlightenment- will lead us to a recognition of the categorical imperative as the law of our own autonomy and so to the good.”

 

“Kant’s thought is that a reflective person asks herself whether the consideration on which she proposes to act may really be treated as a reason to act. [...] whether it may be taken as normative. [...] can be regarded as a kind of law.”

 

*의지의 원칙의 기본값 : 자기애 → 반성 → 계몽된 의지의 원칙 : 도덕법칙(정언명령)

*반성적인(reflective) 사람 : 행위의 의도가 행위의 이유/규범/법칙이 될 수 있는지를 되묻는 사람

⇒ 행위를 의지하는 원칙이 올바르기 위해서는 반성을 통한 계몽이 필요함

 

“When the moral law commands us not to do an action to which we are inclined, it thwarts the inclination, and it humiliates our self-conceit. These feelings are painful. At the same time, however, we experience an awareness of our freedom, which is revealed by our capacity to set inclination aside.”

 

“The complex mix of affect that results is the feeling of respect for law. Respect for law is not a desire to obey the moral law, or more generally a feeling that exists independently of the law and interests us in it. It is the law itself, the very thought of a requirement, operating as an incentive.”

 

“When we are motivated by respect for law, the rational will provides not only the ground of choice but also the incentive to act in accordance with that ground. [...] This is the fullest expression of autonomy, and it is this that gives her actions their special moral worth.”

 

*도덕 법칙의 요구 → 고통 but 해방감/자유로움 → 법칙에 대한 존경

*법칙에 대한 존경이 행위의 동기(motivation, incentive)가 되는 경우

  : 행위 선택의 근거와 그 근거에 따라 행위할 동기가 제공되며, 그 행위가 자율의 완전한 표현이 되고 특별한 도덕적 가치를 가지게 됨

 

Acting for the Sake of the Noble

 

“The bare possibility of continence, of course, shows that Aristotle thinks that human agents have the power to step back from our inclinations and decide whether to act on them or not.”

 

“For Aristotle makes it clear that what makes continence and virtue both good states is the fact that both of them involve the right kind of choice.”

 

*자제(continence)의 가능성 = 경향성에서 한 걸음 물러나 그에 따라 행위를 할지 결정할 가능성

*자제 + 옳은 선택 = 좋은 상태(도덕적 상태)

 

“Aristotle decides [...] choice must be the deliberate desire of something in our own power. An action is chosen when we have exercised rational deliberation in determining what we are to do, and we are moved by that deliberation to act.”

 

“‘we deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends’(ta pros to telos: NE 3.3 1112b12)”

 

“To be an end, something must be conceived as good, where that conception in turn is an act of the rational part of the soul. And to be chosen, to be an object of deliberate desire, an action must be one that contributes to an end in this sense, one that contributes to what is conceived as good.”

 

*선택(choice) : deliberate desire of something (in our own power - 이성)

*숙고(deliberation)의 대상 : what contributes to ends

*목적(ends)의 조건 : something must be conceived as good

⇒ 선택된 행위 : 이성적 숙고의 대상으로서 좋은 것으로 여겨지는 것(목적)에 기여하는 행위

 

“It is the whole package –the action along with its purpose, sacrificing your life for the sake of your country- that is chosen for its own sake. As for nobility, Aristotle seems to think of it very much as Kant thinks of good will- it is the specific kind of intrinsic value that moral actions and those who perform them possess.”

 

*아리스토텔레스가 제시하는 덕스러운 행위자가 좋은 행위(good actions)를 하는 세 가지 이유

  : 1) some specific purposes 2) for their own sake 3) for the sake of the noble

  ⇒ 1)과 2)는 하나로 이해해야 함

        ex) 전장에서 싸우다 죽는 행위는 나라를 위해 목숨을 바치는 행위이고, 그런 의미에서 그 자체로 추구되는 행위

  ⇒ 3)은 도덕적 행위와 그 행위자가 갖는 내재적 가치로 이해해야 함

 

“Still it does seem natural to identify an action’s nobility with the fact that it is in accordance with the orthos logos, the right reason. Its being in accordance with the orthos logos is what makes it intrinsically right, and it is to this intrinsic rightness that the virtuous person responds. If this is right, a noble action, like a good-willed action, is one that embodies a principle of reason.”

 

“So the capacity to choose is a capacity to make a reflective judgment about the value of an action as such and to be moved by that judgment to perform or avoid the action. Importantly, this is at the same time a form of self-command, a capacity to give shape to our own characters and identities. [...] To exercise it, especially under circumstances that make it difficult, is to act from duty and so to display that special form of moral worth that Aristotle calls nobility.”

 

*행위의 고귀함(nobility) = 옳은 이유에서 행위함, 이성의 원칙을 체현함, 의무에 따라 행위함

*행위자의 고귀함(nobility) = 자기지시함, 우리 자신의 성격과 정체성을 스스로 형성함

⇒ Act from duty (good-willed action) = Act for the sake of the noble (noble action)

 

“A maxim passes the categorical imperative test only if everyone with that purpose could do that action- that is, if the parts are combined so that the maxim can be universalized and so can serve as a law. [...] The action that is in accordance with the orthos logos is done in the right way and at the right time, directed to the right objects, and so on. So we might think that its overall rightness consists in the way its parts are combined, that is, in its form.”

 

*정언명령(categorical imperative)과 옳은 이유(orthos logos)의 공통점

  : 준칙의 부분들(질료)을 조합하여 법칙으로서 기능하게 하는 준칙의 형상에 해당

 

Acting from Natural Inclination

 

“What is at work here is a difference between Kant’s and Aristotle’s view of what inclination is, which in turn depends on a difference in their views of what pleasure and pain are. The difference is that Aristotle thinks of pleasure and pain as something like perceptions of the reasons for actions, while Kant apparently does not believe that pleasure and pain in general play this role.”

 

*칸트와 아리스토텔레스의 차이 : 경향성 혹은 즐거움과 고통에 대한 관점 차이

  - 아리스토텔레스 : 즐거움과 고통은 perceptions of the reasons for action

  - 칸트 : 즐거움과 고통은 does not play this role

 

“To take pleasure in something is to perceive it as good or bad, that is, as a reason for pursuit or avoidance. This is why Aristotle insists, throughout the ethics, that it is so essential to get our pleasures right.”

 

“[...] our conception of good and evil must be accompanied by images of our circumstances as pleasant or painful in certain ways. It is because of the way the mind works that the virtuous person must experience pleasures and pains in the right way in order to think correctly about practical matters: thinking of something as good is inseparable from imagining it, so to speak, as pleasant.”

 

“The virtuous person’s reason, by contrast, is in unchallenged control of her perceptual imagination. And this is Aristotle’s solution to the problem of receptivity. In the fully virtuous person, the entire appetitive part of the soul serves as a kind of sensorium for reason.”

 

*아리스토텔레스에게 있어 즐거움

  = 좋은 것으로 여김, 추구할 이유가 있는 것으로 여김, 좋은 것의 형상화(imagining)

*덕스러운 사람의 이성과 경향성

  - 덕스러운 사람의 이성은 형상화(즐거움)를 완전히 지배

  - 덕스러운 사람의 영혼(심리)의 수용성(경향성)은 이성의 감지 기관으로 작동

 

“Kant thinks that pleasure and pain are mere feeling, that they are, to put the point a little bluntly, stupid, he also thinks that inclination is stupid. The fact that you have an inclination for something does not tell you anything about that thing or even anything about your own condition. It only signals the thing’s relationship to you.”

 

“He thinks that an inclination signals only a certain subjective suitability between the sympathetic person and the promotion of the happiness of others, a fitness of sympathetic action to gratify this particular person.”

 

“For Kant, sympathy is not a proto-virtue but merely a kind of substitute for virtue which nature has given us in the meantime. And this makes it look as if the inclinations and feelings which we are required to develop in order to solve the problem of receptivity will also have to be regarded as mere tool and helps.”

 

*칸트에게 있어 경향성

  - 즐거움과 고통은 그저 멍청한(아무런 이성적 기능이 없는) 느낌일 뿐

  - 행위자의 대상에 대한 경향성은 행위자와 대상 사이의 주관적으로 적합한 관계(행위자에게 만족감을 가져다주는 관계)만을 지시함

  - 호의(sympathy, 동정심)는 덕(humanity, autonomy)의 대용물이자 덕으로 가는 도구에 불과

 

“But I do not think that this marks a difference in the basic ethical outlooks of Aristotle and Kant. Although there is a difference in the way these two philosophers propose to solve the problem of receptivity, the problem of receptivity arises for both of them because of the deep similarity in their general conception of what ethics is all about. Human action is not like anything else: as human beings we choose our actions, and, because of that, it is possible for us to transcend mere reactivity in our relationship to the world. The most general and substantive question of ethics is what we should do with this power, which actions we should choose.”

 

*칸트와 아리스토텔레스의 공통 견해

  : 인간으로서 우리는 행위를 선택할 수 있고, 이를 통해 세계와의 관계에서 단순한 수용성을 초월할 수 있으며, 윤리학은 이러한 상황에서 어떠한 행위를 선택하는지에 대한 문제이다.

  ⇒ 이러한 공통 견해에서부터 수용성의 문제를 어떻게 해결할지에 대한 견해차가 파생되는 것